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In showing this, the Russellian notion of description appropriately modified will play an essential role. Indeed it is evident that, in its semantic intention, the axiom of Ontology is quite similar to the Russellian theory of description. 1 Hiz [1977] shows in fact that the Russellian definition of description is inferentially equivalent to the axiom of Ontology in a sense to be specified2, namely for semantic categories higher than that of names.
The present paper will show the logical fact that LI suitably enriched is inferentially equivalent to Ontology for the lowest semantic category as well. As a consequence Lesniewski's Ontology is not and should not be regarded as a system which is rather unique and specific, being isolated from the usually accepted logical framework. It is a logically natural extension of Frege-Russellian logical system with identity and description. It is something which could well have been proven before, but as far as I know it has not yet been proven. This is certainly because of the ontological prejudice which has dominated the main stream of logical analysis since the very time when it was created by its founders3. Thus let us accept a news position concerning names in order to get rid of this inconvenience.
Namely, we widen the semantic category of names to general names to include 1) general designative names, 2) singular names and 3) empty names. In addition a name can be structurally a) simple or b) complex7. A definite description is a name which is 2b), i.e. singular and complex. Widened in this way, names get proper autonomous status in LI. 1.2. A point which arises due to this conceptual change in names is the logical status of the copula 'is'.
Three or four different usages of 'is' are acknowledged in the philosophy of language which accompanies LI8. That is, 1) the 'is' in predica tive use, 2) the 'is' in the role of identity, 3) the 'is' in the role of existence, and eventually 4) the 'is' in the role of inclusions.
According to the standard view, they are totally different from each other, and need to be expressed by different symbolism.
This implies that one usage is not definable by the other usages. But a close look will show that such a conception apparently runs against our general understanding of the logical grammatical structure and function of singular proposi tions of the form 'A is b', where 'is' appears in predicative use.
The singular-predicative use of 'is' seems to be logico-semantically prior to the other ways of its use, because the 'is' in the role of identity, the 'is' in the role of 4. I call an expression purely syncategorematic if it has no semantic category assigned. This differes from the standard usage of 'syncategorematic'. On the standard usage of the term, cf. e. g. Gochet [1980] , p. 15. 5. Usually with the exception of singular simple terms, i.e. proper names or individual constants. But notice that this theoretical attitude reached its extreme in Quine [1948] . He shunned there even proper names, converting them to descriptive terms. 6. It is in fact not new by any means. Our natural intuition of language has been well aware of this fact, and to those who accept the Lesniewskian idea of language, this has been from the beginning the most natural attitude toward names. The point is that this unnatural view to restrict the semantic category of names only to that of singular ones has gained rather uncritical support for a relatively long time and the traditional view has been almost totally forgotten since the birth of LI. 7. Cf. e. g. Lejewski [1958] . Cf. also Kaplan [1970], esp. pp. 284-6 where he discusses what it is for a semantics of a language to be perfect. 8. Cf. Hintikka [1983] . 9. Notice that the 'is' in the role of inclusion gets a natural sense when we have at hand general names or sets.
existence as well as the 'is' in the role of inclusion are definable in terms of the singular-predicative 'is'. Let us write the singular-predicative 'is' as 'is'10. Now we say 'a is b' when and only when a is an object such that it is in fact b. This is the truth condition under which the 'is' in the predicative role is used. Now the other three ways of use of 'is' can be defined in the following way: 1) we say that a is-identical-with b when and only when a is b and b is a; 2) we say that there is such a thing as F when and only when there is some object such that it is F. 3) We say that a is included in b when and only when for every object x if x is a then x is b. What is more, a close examination of the truth condition of singular-predicative propositions tells us that we say that a is an object when and only when a is a. Thus, once we have the predicative 'is' at hand, the others are definable, so that there seems no alleged discrepancy between the different usages of 'is'. 
The identity appearing in LI is usually connected with existence. And it is usual to take '[Ex](x=a)' or its LI-equivalent 'a=a' as stating 'there is an object a' or 'a is an object'16.
But recall now that we have widened the semantic category of names to include names in the widest sense. Now a careful examination of the axioms will show soon that the identity that is syntactically regulated by these axioms need not necessarily be connected with the notion of existence. That is evidently a matter that belongs to semantics. It is held to be so only because of the view usually accepted concern 14. This is a name that is general and complex. Another example of such a device is participle. E. g. in Latin the name 'currens (runner, that which runs)' is constructed from 'currere (to run)'. For more on this point, cf. e. g. Henry [1972] . 15. AI2 and AI3 are naturally deducible from the others. 16. There is a good philosophical reason to hold that 'a is-identical-with itself' is equivalent to 'a is an individual object'. An argument for it is in Waragai [1985] . The reason I put forward for it is very different from that which is usually given on the basis of Quinian referential interpretation of quantifiers. As for a viewpoint concerning the difference in the manner of ontological commitment between 'a=a' and '[Ex] (x=a)', cf., e. g. Hintikka [1969] . His viewpoint is supported by the acceptance of referential reading of quantifiers.
-236-ing the so-called 'existential quantifier'17. Indeed AI0, AI1, AI2 are all satisfied by taking '=' as extensional identity between names,18 and as for AI3, if we take an extreme extensionalism in doing logic, it is also satisfied under the same interpreta tion. Thus seen, the identity in LI is neutral as to ontological commitment if we are ready to reject the dogma of referential interpretation of the quantifier. And the Quinian interpretation of the quantifier as the only vehicle to express the ontological commitment that a theory has seems to be a mere dogma. Apparently the quantifier is only one of the candidates to express existence. Indeed we may well think of some other device to convey the ontological commitment of the theory concerned. And with this change in names, Quinian interpretation breaks down clearly and necessarily. We need another device to state our ontological commit ment.
To state the situation in other words, LI fails to distinguish two different kinds of identity. Namely extensional identity and individual identity.
The former is free of ontological commitment, while the latter conveys ontological commitment.
We have to be clear in this point. Let us keep the identity sign '=' of LI for extensional identity.
Since it will be shown in the due course that the notion of extensional identity can be defined on the basis of individual identity, let us now pass on to analyzing the notion of individual identity.
An Analysis of Individual Identity
Let us consider a special case of the 'is' in predicative use 1) the truthcondition of which is: TC1 'a is b' is true iff a is an object such that it is b19 and 2) the logical behavior of which is regulated by the following axiom:
Under TC1 the following holds: TC2 If a is b then a is an object. Thus if we accept the truth condition TC1 concerning the copula 'is', the role of ontological burden is conveyed by the formulae of the form 'a is b'. From this we get the following:
17. In other words, 'particular quantifier with Quinian referential/object-oriented inter pretation'. 18. Two names 'a' and 'b' are extensionally identical when they have the same extension. 19. Be careful that the 'is' on the left hand appears in technical sense, while the 'is' on the right hand is used in everyday use. Now as was shown in Waragai [1987] , this 'is' plays the role of the 'is' in the role of individual identity. Thus we are allowed to use AI as an axiom which determines the logical behavior of the 'is' in the role of identity. We will use '=0' hereafter to express individual identity.
We pose the following as the axiom of individual identity.
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Thus Ontology finds its place in a natural extension of LI with description. Now we define the notion of extensional identity in the following way:
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